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The Eastern Question played a decisive role in the development of the Great 
Poǁeƌs͛attitude. The roots of the set of problems are closely related to the 
expansive aspirations of Russia. Resulting from the geostrategic position of the 
eŵpiƌe, the BalkaŶs ďeĐaŵe a ĐoŶstaŶt taƌget of ‘ussia͛s foƌeigŶ politiĐal 
ambitions. The ethnic fragmentation of the region, the aspirations for 
independence of the peoples living under Ottoman domination and the 
decentralized character of the Constantinople administration provided excellent 
opportunities for St Petersburg to realize their aspirations to enforce their 
interests. The conflicts, related to the Eastern Question, apart from the dissolution 
of the BalkaŶs͛ status Ƌuo, ŵeaŶt the peƌŵaŶeŶt aŶd ƌealistiĐ thƌeat of the 
possible restrain of free shipping in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea. It was the increasing threat posed on the straights and the commercial 
roads to India that motivated the active role of Great Britain in the Eastern 
Question. The stabilisation of the political circumstances in the region resulted in 
the periodic and limited cooperation of the two powers competing to acquire 
influence in the area iŶ the seĐoŶd half of the ϭϴϮϬ͛s.  
Nevertheless the relation between Great Britain and Russia altered in the first 
half of the ϭϴϯϬ͛s. Russia gained a considerable influence in the Near East and the 
strengthening of her positions gave new dynamism to the Anglo-Russian rivalry. 
One of the most important manifestations of the ambivalent liaison between the 
two states was the so-called Vixen Affair of 1836 which can be a prominent 
example of the above mentioned tendency. 
Keywords: Anglo-Russian rivalry, Eastern Question, Black Sea, Circassia, 
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Conflict management forms an integral part of the sovereign foreign policy in 
all states. The ways of resolving the clashes of views between countries greatly 
depend on the nature of the circumstances in the concrete case, on whether the 
possibility of consensus-making is a realistic option or not and on the 
characteristics of the direct discourse and relationships between the parties 
involved. The diplomatic way to remedy conflicts is considered as an evident 
strategy in relation to great power politics, however, using this method does not 
prove to be self-evident at every turn. Settling disputes in an amicable way or 
negotiating can present such a difficulty in some cases for the Governments as it is 
by using armed forces. This applies in particular, if in the politics of a given state – 
in this case Great Britain – the stand of the public opinion – quasi as a fourth factor 
– increasingly prevails next to the principles and ideas declared by the Monarch, 
the Cabinet or the Parliament. An exemplary case of the factors outlined above is 
 
 




the Vixen conflict of 1836, which was the diplomatic level manifestation of 
decades of conflicts between London and St Petersburg. 
Traditional diplomatic history works deal tangentially with the development of 
the relationship between Great Britain and Russia in the first half of the 19th 
century, while studies in connection with the history of Anglo-Russian relations 
discuss this topic in greater detail.1 The common point in all cases is the rivalry 
regarding both the European Affairs and the Eastern Question which was 
associated basically with the increasing continental influence of the St Petersburg 
Cabinet on the one hand, and with the will of controlling this process from the 
British side on the other hand. This tendency was still typical in the 1830͛s, which 
resulted in an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the British and the Russian 
Governments in the second half of the decade. 
All of this was based on the differences observed between the methods of 
crisis management which were seen already during the Greek War of 
Independence and in parallel during the Russian-Turkish War of 1828–29, but then 
markedly manifested during the first Egyptian Crisis (1833). Due to Russia's 
military support in the Sublime Porte, and later the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 
signed on 8th July, Russia wielded major influence in the region.2 Under the 
agreement between St Petersburg and Constantinople „[…] the two High 
Contracted Parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and 
the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respecting dominions. 
Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the 
Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned 
to it by affording substantial aid […] in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish 
in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall 
confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of 
the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter 
therein under any pretext whatsoever.”3 In practice, this meant that if any kind of 
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attack had been carried out against the Ottoman Empire, the chance for Russia to 
use the straits opened, otherwise the Porte blocked the straits from the fleets of 
foreign powers.4 This action undoubtedly resulted in the strengthened position of 
St Petersburg giving a fresh impetus to the rivalry of the two leading powers, 
England and Russia. But the great power rivalry emerged in the international arena 
had escalated to new areas. In addition to the classic scenes of Europe and the 
eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and Asian regions 
gradually started to become the centre of the conflicts of interest of the two 
states͛ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ.5 The Vixen Conflict linked to this course and was also related 
to the Russian expansion in the Circassian area. 
The Government of St Petersburg made serious efforts from the 1820͛s 
onwards in order to strengthen its political influence over the Western Caucasus.6 
The legal framework for these ambitions later was provided by the Treaty of 
Adrianople of 1829, which allowed Russia to extend its right of control over the 
region.7 This at the same time marked the beginning of the escalation of armed 
conflicts with the local tribes. However, Russian military action launched to 
conquer Circassia was not a novel thing. Since the end of the 18th century the 
objectives of the St Petersburg Govermnent included the annexation plan of the 
Western Caucasus, which resulted in a series of larger and smaller wars /conflicts 
over the decades.8 More active action from the Russian side, however, only took 
place in the early 1830͛s, a part of which the Cabinet of St Petersburg introduced a 
blockade from 1831 on the coasts stretching from Gelendzhik to Sevastopol in 
order to isolate local resisters.9 The sequestration of the Cuban coasts proved to 
be a long-term solution thus it was left in place for a several more years. Still, the 
status of Western Caucasus regions was not clear regardless of the validity of the 
above mentioned treaty. 
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As it was already mentioned, St Petersburg derived its right to control over the 
territory from the Russian-Turkish agreement signed in September 14, 1829, which 
ƌeĐoƌded ‘ussia͛s teƌƌitoƌial gaiŶ.10 Although Great Britain did not make an official 
stand on the matter, the Foreign Office collected information constantly on the 
events took place in the Western Caucasus. The Foreign Secretary relied in this 
issue mainly on the reports of Lord Ponsonby, British ambassador to 
Constantinople and Jeames Yeames, British consul in Odessa.11  
The Russian influence prevailing in the Western Caucasus caused growing British 
anxiety in the second half of the 1830͛s, since by this time even the possibility of 
annexation became a realistic alternative. Lord PoŶsoŶďǇ͛s ƌepoƌts, dated between 
1834 and 1836, constantly referred to the unsolved Question of Circassia and the 
dangers of St Peteƌsďuƌg͛s eǆpaŶsiǀe behaviour. In the report sent to Palmerston on 
September 16, 1834, the ambassador to Constantinople stated his detailed point of 
view about the current situation in Circassia. Pƌioƌ to PosoŶďǇ͛s individual 
assessment, he provided information to David Urquhart about his expeditionary 
activities planned in the given area.12 He outlined his concept in this context. 
Ponsonby believed that by taking the east coasts of the Black Sea under control, the 
Government of St Petersburg wanted to enrich its territory with an area where 
about six million inhabitants lived, and he considered this method as a step contrary 
to the European equilibrium policy.13 In another report, the ambassador stressed the 
threat of the European system of balance. Ponsonby worded as follows: „It is evident 
to all ǁho kŶoǁ aŶy thiŶg of йasteƌŶ affaiƌs that the ĐoŶƋuest of the CauĐasus’ tƌiďes 
and the possession of their country will give more power to Russia, than she has 
gained by the overthrow of Poland, and that the power so gained will operate 
formidably to the detriment of English interests both political and commercial.”14 In 
addition, he emphasized for the head of the Foreign Office that „ […] if Circassia be 
subdued by Russia, the task of protecting the independence of Turkey and Persia, will 
be rendered tenfold more difficult.”15 
After these preliminaries the so called Vixen Conflict had emerged. The background 
to this case was the detention of the British merchant vessel of the same name by 
Russian authorities. The schooner was first spotted on 24th November, 1836 at the 
coasts of Circassia subjected to blockade.16 Soon afterward, a ship with Russian ensign 
– under the leadership of Captain N. P. Vulf – was instructed to follow the Vixen. The 
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seizure of the Vixen took place two days later in the Bay of Sudzuk-Kale.17 The seized 
ship was owned by the Bell Company trading and shipping company. In accordance 
with the procedures of the Russian authorities the Vixen was transported first to 
Gelendzhik, and later to Sevastopol.18 The cargo of the merchant vessel was 
confiscated, while the British crew was placed in Odessa.19  
James Yeames, British consul in Odessa was informed about the events on 12th 
December directly by James Bell, who not only was one of the owners of the vessel 
in question, but also the direct stakeholder of the events.20 The British consul in 
Odessa forwarded the information described by Bell to Lord Ponsonby, British 
ambassador to Constantinople first21, and then a few days later to Lord Durham, 
British ambassador to St Petersburg.22 In the second phase of that process, the 
Foreign Office received reports from the above mentioned diplomatic 
representatives, on the basis of which Lord Palmerston evaluated the situation 
evolved. From the aforesaid reports the most dominant ones were written by the 
British ambassador to St Petersburg, since Lord Durham held direct intercourse with 
K. R. Nesselrode, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The two held their first 
consultation on the matter on 7th January, 1837. Durham put the substantive 
elements of the discussion very succinctly: „On the 7th (January) instant, Count 
Nesselrode called on me for the purpose of making me acquainted with the 
circumstances attending the seizure and confiscation of the ship Vixen, on the coast 
of Circassia.”23 The British ambassador to St Petersburg emphasized in his letter to 
the Foreign Secretary that in his view the case did not require serious actions on 
behalf of the British Cabinet: „As the official report from the Admiral commanding on 
that station, and the declaration of the Russian Government […] I deem it 
unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with a repetition in writing […].”24 The position 
of the Cabinet of St Petersburg on the matter – which was published in the St 
Petersburg Journal issued on 31st December 1836/12th January 1837 – was fully 
attached to this letter. The communication made it clear that the vessel had 
intended to trade with local tribes of Circassia. The vessel transported salt, a product 
that was put on the blacklist according to the Russian custom and trade regulations. 
The Russian Government wished to clear the situation, therefore defined 
accurately the status of the area in question and the content of the provisions in 
force since 1831. In addition, as an important action the Government declared 
                                                             
17 Ibid.  
18 INGLE: 64.  
19 Ibid. 64–65.  
20 Mr. James Bell to Mr Consul General Yeames. Theodosia, December 12, 1836. 
TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. Enclosure 2 in No 11.  
21 Mr. Consul General Yeames to Lord Ponsonby. Odessa, December 20, 1836. 
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22 Mr. Consul General Yeames to the Earl of Durham. Odessa, December 22, 1836. 
TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. No 13.  
23 The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston. St. Petersburg, January 12, 1837. 
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anew – and confirmed at the same time – all the information related to the health 
and custom regulations which were described in the circular letters sent out by M. 
Butenev in October, 1831, and on 13th September, 1836 to the representatives of 
foreign powers in Constantinople. 
Consequently, Durham was basically restrained in terms of his behaviour and the 
resolution of the case. Although he faithfully represented the official position of the 
British Government during the consultations with Nesselrode in January 1837, under 
which the Cabinet in London demanded compensation for the unlawful confiscation 
of the cargo of the Vixen25, but in fact, he tried to convince Palmerston to reduce 
British demands. Nesselrode stood for a similar point of view as well. In his opinion, 
the Russian Government had acted in a correct manner in case of the Vixen Affair. In 
his formal justification sent to the British ambassador to St Petersburg he wrote as 
follows: „That vessel has been confiscated, because, having on board a cargo of 
prohibited goods, it entered a port belonging to Russia in virtue of the Treaty of 
Adrianople […] whereas the Russian regulations […] prohibit foreign vessels from 
entering that port, where there is neither a custom-house nor a quarantine 
establishment; and, on the other hand, open to them at a short distance from thence 
the port of Anapa, where the Vixen would have been freely admitted if she had been 
engaged in an ordinary and legal commercial enterprize.”26 Since Russians assessed 
the circumstances of the case unequivocal, the captain of the Vixen and George Bell 
were declared smugglers, thus formal procedures were carried out accordingly.27 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Government of St Petersburg sought to 
comply with the principle of fairness while handling the situation. A proof of this is 
that the accused were pardoned by Nicholas I and he let them to leave for 
Constantinople, the costs of which were stood by the Emperor himself.28  
In short it can be said that the form of crisis management was moderate in St 
Petersburg, while in London the Cabinet showed a kind of dual behaviour in this 
regard. The British Government declared that the process used by the Russian 
authorities was unlawful, but it did not take any serious diplomatic action for the 
redress of grievances. To prove the illegal nature of the process Lord Palmerston 
called the existence of the blockade into question. The Foreign Secretary explained 
his arguments in his letter dated on 3 February sent to Lord Greville: „The fact is, 
that Russia has never declared a blockade, but has established custom regulations 
confining commerce to one or two points where custom-houses are established, 
and pretends that ships trading to other points on the coast are seizable as 
smugglers. Now to entitle her to make such regulations, she ought to possess the 
coast de jure and de facto. Her right de jure depends upon the Treaty of 
Adrianople, which conveys to her, not Circassia, but the sea coast from the Cuban 
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28 Ibid. 124.  
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to St. Nicolas.”29 On this basis, the disputed points were the question of the 
existence of the blockade on the one hand, and the legal Ŷatuƌe of ‘ussia͛s 
prevailing influence over the Western Caucasus on the other hand. 
In respect of the former question, conflicting information is available. As 
already mentioned, Russia sequestrated the entire length of the Cuban coast in 
1831. The blockade came into force after the release of the йŵpeƌoƌ͛s ukase on 
the matter, which was sent by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to not just 
Constantinople, but to the ambassadors of other European Great Powers – so 
presumably to the British ambassador as well – in September of the same year.30 
However, the Cabinet in London consistently held in connection with the Vixen 
Case that „Her Majesty's Government” had no knowledge of the blockade. This 
picture is somewhat overshadowed by an exchange of letters between the Foreign 
Office and the Bell Company taking place in the spring and summer of 1836. 
The British shipping company wanted to obtain information in connection with the 
conditions of the commercial activity in the Caucasus region. As they described in the 
letter sent on 25th May, 1836, the possibility had opened to the company to build 
closer economic ties with Wallachia. After preliminary discussions with Ruler Alexandru 
II (1834-1842), the Bell Company received concession for the extraction of local salt 
mines and merchandise of goods. The opportunity was thus given, but the start-up of 
the promising venture required precise knowledge about the political and economic 
status of the region, specifically the eastern basin of the Black Sea. According to the 
owners͛ original plan, the salt load was going to sell on the eastern coast of the Black 
Sea, which in part would include the areas affected by the perceived or real blockade. 
In addition to the proximity of the target area, the market receptivity of the population 
in the region gave reality to the idea. Based on these assumptions, George Bell 
requested information on the current status of the area in question in his letter 
addressed to Lord Palmerston: „We therefore request the favour of your Lordship, to 
inform us whether there be any restrictions on the trade with that line of coast which 
aƌe ƌeĐogŶised ďy рis Majesty’s GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt […].”31  
The Foreign Office stressed in its official reply that „ […] рis Majesty’s 
Government does not undertake to guide individuals in determining whether they 
shall enter into, or decline, commercial speculations in foreign countries. It is for 
Individuals to judge for themselves upon such matters […].”32 From the Vixen 
Case͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ it ŵaǇ seem indicative that the official response did not 
provide clear information concerning the status of the Cuban coasts. Interestingly, 
in the debate erupted in the Parliament later in connection with the Affair of the 
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Vixen, the accusations against the Cabinet in London – saying that the Government 
urged the attempt to break up the blockade in the Caucasus – were rejected by 
Palmerston by referring to the same documents. 
The two parties made two further exchange of letters at the end of May and in 
early June in 1836. As for the content of the documents, essential new elements 
do not appear, however, it is important to emphasize that more and more specific 
wording occurred in the letters of the owners of the Bell Company. The question 
raised by the enterprise concerned – initially covertly, later in a more open form – 
the existence of the Russian blockade imposed on a specific section of the 
Circassian coasts. George Bell͛s letteƌ addƌessed to Adŵiƌal йsŵaŶte, ǁhiĐh ǁas 
later forwarded to Palmerston by Lord Durham, can be an interesting supplement 
to all this, as it referred to the content of the preliminary correspondence between 
the Foreign Office and the executives of the Bell Company. George Bell pointed 
out that the British Government identified the London Gazette as a basic 
orientation. But the newspaper did not published any articles about the 
restrictions imposed by the Russians along the coasts of the Caucasus, so the 
owners of the Vixen set sailing without knowing anything about the prohibition.33  
To the interpretation or a more thorough understanding of the problems relating 
the blockade and the circular letter of 1831, the presentation of the British and the 
Russian Governments' rhetoric and using of terminology is inevitable, and may serve as 
a guidance to the hardships in the exchange of letters mentioned above. Namely the 
sequestration of the Circassian coasts had not been accepted neither in London nor in 
St Petersburg. Russia assessed the measures applied on the affected areas as a severity 
of certain points of the custom and trade regulations executed in accordance with the 
existing law. And about all these changes Russia provided a full range of information 
through the Russian ambassador to Constantinople. Butenev sent out his report dated 
on 13 September, 1836, to the local delegates of both the Porte and the European 
Great Powers: „In the course of the year 1831, and specifically  by the communication 
of the 30 September/12 October of that year, I had the honour, by order of my Court, to 
acquaint the Representatives of Foreign Powers at Constantinople with the measures 
which my Government had thenceforth established, with respect to foreign vessels 
frequenting the eastern coast of the Black Sea, belonging to Russia, with the twofold 
view of preserving those coasts from the introduction of the plague, and of preventing 
smuggling on the same coast.”34 Then added: „Some cases having since occurred, in 
which the regulations on this matter have been disregarded, the Imperial Government 
now finds itself called upon to provide with greater vigilance for the strict observance of 
the existing regulations, and has commanded me to repeat the communications 
formerly made on this matter.”35 Based on the quotation above, the Russians referred 
                                                             
33 Messrs. Bell and Childs to Admiral Esmante, Gelednjik, December 2, 1836. 
TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. Enclosure 2 in No 15.  
34 M. de BoutéŶeff to эoƌd PoŶsoŶďǇ, BuǇukdéƌé, le ϭ/ϭϯ Septeŵďƌe, ϭϴϯϲ. TNA/P‘O/нO/977/344. 
Enclosure in No 7.  
35 Ibid.  
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very clearly to the existence of the memorandum dated five years earlier and the 
continuous validity of the provisions included. Nesselrode insisted coherently on these 
elements all along the negotiations about the Vixen. The correctness of the above 
mentioned justification and the Russian Foreign Minister's behaviour is supported by 
John Henry MaŶdeǀille͛s report dated on 26th October, 1831, addressed to Palmerston, 
which confirmed the restrictions imposed, and also included Butenev͛s memorandum, 
in which the Russian ambassador – in response to the instructions of the St Petersburg 
Cabinet – provided information about regulations affect foreign ships and their 
commercial activities.36 The document thus reached the British Government, in fact it 
was included in the document collection containing all the materials and exchange of 
letters related to the Case of the Vixen, which was published in 1837 in order to inform 
representatives of the House of Commons and House of Lords.37 
The factors lying behind the British CaďiŶet͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ ŵust ďe ĐoŶsideƌed in 
the light of all this. In view of the correspondence between the Bell Company and the 
Foreign Office, as well as the content of the Russian memorandum, inconsistencies to 
some extent from эoŶdoŶ͛s side ĐaŶ ďe oďseƌǀed. It is difficult to deny the fact that the 
British Cabinet – during the Governments led by Charles Grey (1830–1834) and later by 
Lord Melbourne (1835–1841) – was aware of St Peteƌsďuƌg͛s measures and the nature 
and means of Russian policy applied in Circassia. Still, interestingly enough, the British 
representatives of foreign affairs were not fully aware of the developments.38 The 
double-faced rhetoric of the British political circles can be presented best by the 
permanent use of the term ͚blockade͛ to describe a phenomenon / status which – 
according to its main attributes – can be partly equivalent to the notion, but by no 
means identical with it in theoretical and legal terms. Since Russia did not declared the 
blockade of the eastern coast of the Black Sea in 1831, therefore this term was not 
used on the level of diplomacy. By contrast, in British documents the word stands 
regularly in itself, or in many cases as a synonym for the more stringent legal 
regulations. This kind of inconsistency or falsehood resulted that the leadership in 
London apparently advocated against the illegality of a blockade, which never officially 
existed from the Russian perspective. 
For Great Britain, the biggest problem was actually that they considered the 
restrictions imposed by St Petersburg as measures affecting free trade which 
essentially violated the British economic interests.39 This view was formulated 
                                                             
36 Mr. Mandeville to Viscount Palmerston, Therapia, October 31, 1831. TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. 
Further Papers (B) Relating to the Seizure and Confiscation of the Vixen by the Russian Government. 
Ponsonby later also referred to the Russian memorandum sent to Mandeville. Relating to this see: 
Ponsonby to Palmesrton, September 21, 1836. TNA/PRO/FO/977/344. No 160.  
37 TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. Further Papers (B) Relating to the Seizure and Confiscation of the Vixen 
by the Russian Government. 
38 Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, Therapia October 28, 1836. TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. No 8. 
Mr. Consul General James Yeames to Lord Ponsonby, Odessa, December 20, 1836. 
TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. Enclosure 1 in No 11.  
39 It is worth mentioning that the quarantine decree concerning a certain section of the Danube 
delta entered into force also in 1836, which was again considered by Great Britain as a hinder of free 
economic activity. See: ARDELEANU, C.: Russian-British Rivalry Regarding Danube Navigation and the 
 
 




most clearly by Lord Durham in connection with an earlier incident: „With respect 
to the question, how far Russia has a right to restrain the commerce of other 
countries […] I have to observe that by the Law of Nations, no state has a right to 
restrict the commerce of other nations with a country over which the right of 
sovereignty de jure is claimed, but where no jurisdiction is exercised.”40 But he also 
recognized that „This rule, however, may be subject of modification if there be a 
partial occupation, in which case […] a right to seizure vessels contravening 
municipal regulations might be maintained.”41 
The impact of the public opinion and its influence on the Vixen Case can be 
approached from several aspects. First, in terms of representation of the leading 
media outlets, which may indicate the general method of presentation of events. 
On the other hand, in perspective of the publicist activity of a particular person, 
David Urquhart in this case. With regard to the diplomatic affair the first not 
official reaction on the British side was an article in The Morning Chronicle 
published on 20th December, 1836, to which the publication in the St Petersburg 
Journal referred as well. The two periodicals – not surprisingly – represented the 
very different interpretation of the given events, which showed significant 
differences in both content and stylistic point of view. In the English papeƌ͛s 
opinion the aim of the Vixen was „ […] to ƌaise the illegal and piratical blockade 
estaďlished ďy Russia oŶ the Đoast of CiƌĐassia […].”42 The Times and other British 
papers held a similar point of view reporting undoubtedly that a significant portion 
of the cargo of the schooner in question was made out of guns and gunpowder.43 
St Peteƌsďuƌg͛s ƌestƌaiŶed politics in this case can be traced at this point as 
well. The Russian Cabinet always avoided to deal with the real purpose of the 
Vixen and in respect of the conflict they put the emphasis only on the problem of 
violation of the trade regulations. It had two main reasons: on the one hand 
Nesselrode tried to smooth the tension established between Great Britain and 
Russia, and on the other hand he evidently did not want to raise the events took 
place in the Caucasus into the international political arena.44 
As of the Vixen case, mentioning the role of David Urquhart is of great 
importance as well. He was a diplomat born in Scotland, who served in the 
Ottoman Empire in the 1830s, and from 1835 to 1837 he served as the first 
secretary of Lord Ponsonby, British ambassador to Constantinople. One of the 
most important fundamentals of David Urquhart͛s foreign policy mind-set was his 
insistence to the anti-Russian view. Consequently, he opposed the policy 
                                                                                                                                              
Origins of the Crimean War (1846–1853). Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 2010, Vol. 19., No 2., 166.  
40 Lord Durham Draft. Februrary 29, 1836. TNA/PRO/FO/97/344. No 13.  
41 Ibid. 
42 The Morning Chronicle, 20 December, 1836.  
43 Ibid. The Times, 22 December, 1836.; Morning Post, 21 December, 1836.; London Standard, 20 
December 1836. This allegation was later confuted in a statement by the owners of the Vixen: Morning 
Post, 7 February 1837. 
44 BOLSOVER, G. H.: Urquhart and the Eastern Question. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 8, No 4 
(Dec., 1936), 465.  
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represented by Palmerston. He criticized the Government for failing to take 
prompt and effective steps following the arrest of the Vixen and repeatedly hinted 
that Palmerston's conduct is inconsistent with Great Britain's interests.45 His 
personal involvement in the case can partly account for his strong opinion-forming 
manner. Through his relationships, Urquhart held continuous intercourse with the 
Circassian insurgents for whom he supposedly promised future support from the 
British Government. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Bell 
Company launched its vessel towards the eastern coasts of the Caucasus probably 
ŵotiǀated ďǇ UƌƋuhaƌt͛s – and partly PoŶsoŶďǇ͛s – encouragement.46 This 
assumption can be supported by one of George Bell͛s letter who – without 
indicating the name – referred to David Urquhart, who wrote about his visits in 
Circassia in the reports sent from Constantinople. In his detailed description about 
his experience there, Urquhart emphasized that he had not perceived Russian 
control on that particular parts of the coasts of the Black Sea.47  
Both the Cabinet in London as well as the Cabinet in St Petersburg48 had 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ UƌƋuhaƌt͛s eaƌlieƌ activities. As regards the former, we should refer 
to the complications occurred around the appearance of the series called 
Portfolio.49 The multi-volume publication, published in 1835–1836, communicated 
relevant documents about the British-Russian diplomatic relations. Thematically it 
was basically characterized by anti-Russian orientation. Presumably, Urquhart was 
the editor of the publication. Because of the illegally leaked material, Palmerston 
indicated his serious concerns regarding the employment of Urquhart. However, 
the conditions of his deposal50 were created by the Vixen conflict, the submitting 
of which to the Parliament was suggested by Urquhart himself. 51 
Because of the vigorous press coverage of the Anglo-Russian disagreement, the 
case was added to the agenda of the House of Commons and discussed during the 
sitting held on 17th March, 1837.52 Although it is worth mentioning that speeches 
had already been made on the matter a few weeks earlier.53 Members of 
                                                             
45 INGLE: 69. 
46 BOLSOVER: 463-464. FLORESCU: 280.  
47 Mr. George Bell to John Backhouse, Esq., Mitre Chambers, Fenchurch Street, February 20, 1837. 
TNA/PRO/FO/352/61/3. No 19.  
48 ʪепе̹̌ ̬у̭̭ко̐о по̭л̌ ̏ ʦе̦е ˃̌т̛̺е̏̌ ̶̛̏е-к̶̦̌ле̬у ʻе̭̭ел̬̽оде, Ϯ ̥̌́ ;ϭϵ ̌п̬ел́Ϳ 
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1840/Incident_Viksen/text2.htm, downloaded: 3 June, 2014.) 
49 WEBSTER, Ch.: Urquhart, Ponsonby and Palmesrton. The English Historical Review, Vol. 62, No 
244 (Jul., 1947), 332-340. 
50 Balliol College Archives and Manuscripts Collection. David Urquhart Papers. I C8. Letters Relating 
to David Urquhart Recall From Constantinople (1837)..; ROBINSON, G.: David Urquhart. Some Chapters 
in the Life of a Victorian Knight-Errant of Justice and Liberty, Basil Blakcwell, Oxford, 1920. 58. KING, 
CH.: Imaging Circassia. David Urquhart and the Making of North Caucasus Nationalism. The Russian 
Review, 66 (April, 2007), 247. 
51 PURYEAR (1969): 69.  
52 The Vixen – Treaty of Adrianople. House of Commons Debates, 17 March 1837. Hansard, Series 
III. Vol. 37. cc. 621-656. 
53 The Case of the Vixen. House of Commons Debates, 6 February 1837. Hansard, Series III. 
 
 




Parliament asked for a detailed report from Palmerston on the foreign policy 
approach of the Cabinet in London and they questioned the nature of the British 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s involvement in the case.54 Palmerston could block successfully the 
allegations against the Cabinet by referring to the correspondence with the Bell 
Company, but the Foreign Secretary had to face the fact that the Case of the Vixen 
expanded beyond the control of the Foreign Office. Therefore, he sought to end 
the clashes with St Petersburg as soon as possible. Palmerston stated in his letter 
sent to Lord Durham on 19th April, 1837, that the British Government had to take 
urgent steps against all the measures – imposed by Russia – restricting trading 
activities on the eastern coasts of the Black Sea, but at the same time London 
would show willingness to formally acknowledge the legal right of St Petersburg to 
possess the Bay of Sudzhuk-Kale.55  
At the time of the situation generated by the British diplomacy, Nesselrode 
defined the following instructions in his letter addressed to Butenev, Russian 
ambassador to Constantinople: „нoƌ the sake of Russia’s dignity and security, two 
main conditions are required (to be realized). 1. Not letting England to dispute the 
legality of the confiscation of the Vixen. 2. Holding our decision about the 
confiscation of the Vixen in effect, so that the rigor of this act would deter other 
vessels from Great Britain – similar to the one of the Bell Company – from (such) 
attempts which led to the failure of the Vixen.”56 The then accepted directive 
remained the base of the Russian concept till the very end to the conflict. 
After negotiations with Palmerston, Lord Durham asked the Russian Foreign 
Minister to refer about the Case of the Vixen to the Government in St Petersburg 
so that it could give a formal explanation regarding the procedure applied against 
the schooner.57 With this gesture, the British Foreign Secretary had already 
indicated to Nesselrode that he was striving to find a compromise. In his reply on 
9th May, 1837, Nesselrode confirmed again that the Russian Government 
considered the Vixen Affair as a simple violation of custom rules and not as an 
attempt to intervene in the Russian-Circassian conflict.58 A few weeks later, signs 
of a thaw in the British Cabinet actually showed up. Nesselrode reported the 
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following developments in his report sent to inform Pozzo di Borgo, Russian 
ambassador to London: „The British ambassador has just pleased to inform me 
that he had received a report from the Head of the Foreign Secretary. A copy of this 
report is attached. Reading this document, […] рis Majesty’s GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt […] on 
the score of what is listed in my memorandum of 27th April (9th May) does not have 
sufficient motive to cast doubt oŶ Russia’s ƌight to seize and confiscate the Vixen in 
the Bay of Sudjuk Kale (as it happened) and does not intend to lay any further claim 
pertaining to the vessel seized […].”59  
The final chord of the diplomatic disagreement was PalŵeƌstoŶ͛s statement 
saying that „His Majesty's Government in the first place takes into account that 
Sudjuk Kale, which was recognized by Russia in the Convention of 178360 as a 
Turkish possession, is now […] belongs to Russia on the basis of the Treaty of 
Adrianople; furthermore it (also) takes into account that this port is under Russian 
[…] occupation, as His Excellency (Lord Durham) stated it in his report dated on 13th 
May, (and) sees no reason to question Russia’s ƌight to seize and confiscate the 
Vixen in the Bay of Sudjuk Kale […]. His Majesty's Government does not intend to 
lay any further claim against Russia pertaining to the vessel seized.”61 Mutual 
concessions affected reassuringly the leaders of the two states, allowing them to 
solve the Case of the Vixen through diplomatic channels. 
Regarding the conflict took place in 1836–1837, the differences and the same 
features of the ways Great Britain and Russia handled the crisis can be observed, 
which were tough greatly influenced by the special position of the Caucasus region 
involved in the case. The Government of London initially showed a decided 
manner, but later it was paradoxically related with a restrained foreign policy 
activity. The same method can be observed in the case of St Petersburg with the 
marked difference that the Russian negotiators represented a kind of moderate 
stance even during the early consultations. Palmerston͛s speĐifiĐ foreign policy in 
the Case of the Vixen eventually proved successful in terms of the British interests, 
as it provided the opportunity for the amicable settlement of the case, while at the 
same time England could preserve its prestige. Overall, it can be said that the 
peaceful conclusion of the Vixen Affair was the result of the coordination of 
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